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CHALLENGES FOR POLICY MIX IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS – THE CASE OF POLAND 
Joanna Stawska*, Lena Grzesiak** 
Summary: 
The aim of this article is to present the essence of policy mix and the extraordinary actions 
undertaken by the monetary and fiscal authorities in Poland in response to the recent financial 
crisis. In the article, the hypothesis has been put forward that the challenges faced by monetary and 
fiscal authorities have contributed to carrying out coordinated actions, especially in support 
of economic growth during the recent financial crisis. 
As a result, in Poland during the last financial crisis, it seemed to observe greater cooperation 
between monetary and fiscal authorities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis has affected many decisions made by economic 
authorities. The co-operation of the central bank and the government in Poland 
was noticeable to some extent during the crisis. In the literature, there have been 
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many reviews indicating that the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy 
contributes to greater stability of the financial system [Knakiewicz 2006: 111                
–112]. Finally, it was proven that policy mix had an important influence on 
stable growth of each country. Appropriate policy mix is always important, not 
only during the crisis time. We cannot forget that even we made the best choice 
of acceptable policy mix, it is possible that it will not bring the desirable effects 
[Wernik 2002]. The subject of policy mix interactions was brought up inter alia 
by: D. K. Foley, K. Shell, M. Sidrauski [1969], J. B. Taylor [1997: 21–22], 
R. Beetsma and X. Debrun [2004], R. Clarida, J. Galí , M. Gertler [2000], 
H. Bennett, N. Loayza [2001] and K. Flanagan, E. Uyarra, M. Laranja [2011] 
and others.  
The purpose of this paper is to present the essence of policy mix and the 
extraordinary actions of the monetary and fiscal authorities in response to the 
recent financial crisis. The research problem is to verify the assumption that the 
challenges for monetary and fiscal authorities were carried out to coordinate 
actions to significantly support economic growth during the financial crisis. To 
analyze the problem the following research methods have been used: the review 
of the scientific literature, research and statistical methods for graphic 
presentation of economic phenomena. 
1. MONETARY POLICY AND THE PRICES STABILITY 
In Poland, National Bank of Poland, which work is regulated by the Act on 
the NBP (Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 1997 r. o Narodowym Banku Polskim) is in 
charge of monetary policy. The monetary policy in Poland is guided by 
independent central bank (more about Central Bank’s independence in 
A. Cukierman papers [2005: 1–36; 1992: 415–456]. The independence means 
that central bank making its decisions does not head politics preferences 
or suggestions of government. Central bank has financial, personal and 
organizational independence. What is very important, this independence gives 
a guarantee of stability of monetary policy. 
T. Padoa-Schioppa emphasized that monetary policy should be performed 
by independent and responsible institutions whose tasks are clearly defined. This 
also has a fundamental importance for monetary integration, because the central 
bank’s independence is a necessary condition for admission to the European 
Union. This is according to the aforementioned author not only a formal 
requirement, but also an important component needed for the proper functioning 
of economic policy [Padoa-Schioppa 2002: 5]. On the other hand, J. B. Taylor 
says that in fact the independence of the central bank has never existed, because 
the central bank in its decisions  never omits the preferences of the government. 
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from those, who were interested in the possibility of limiting actions of the fiscal 
authorities [Taylor 2013: 17].  
Monetary authority is responsible for the supply of money and purchasing 
power of money. The 3rd Article of the NBP’s Act constitutes that the main aim 
of NBP is maintaining stability levels of prices [Ustawa z dnia 29 sierpnia 
1997 r. o Narodowym Banku Polskim]. It is important to know that there is 
a connection between money supply and inflation rate especially in the long 
term. If the money supply grows too fast, the rate of inflation will increase, and 
if the growth of the money supply is slowed too much, then economic growth 
may also decrease [Mishkin 2007: 29–36]. In Poland, NBP uses the following 
instruments for regulating the level of short-term interest rates: open market 
operations, minimum reserve requirements and the standing – facilities1.  
NBP affects inflation primarily by determining the amount of official 
interest rates, which determine the viability of monetary policy instruments. The 
NBP determines the level of the following interest rates: reference rate, lombard 
rate, rediscount rate and deposit rates. They equal respectively: 2,5%, 4%, 2,75% 
and 1% in Poland (on 10.08.2014)2. The Monetary Policy Council as the organ 
of National Bank of Poland is in charge of fixing interest rates. In Poland central 
bank since 1998 uses the strategy of direct inflation targeting. From the 
beginning of 2004, inflation target is 2,5% with the possibility of deviations 
up to 1 percentage point up and down (for comparison inflation target for 
Eurozone equals below 2%)3.  
Central bank can conduct tight, loose or neutral monetary policy. A tight 
monetary policy is connected with restriction of money supply. Restrictive 
monetary policy is characterized by increase in interest rates on the interbank 
market, and thereby decreases the liquidity of commercial banks. E. Loyo says 
that as a result of tight policy, commercial banks raise interest rates on loans and 
deposits, which is the cause of limiting expenditures (investments) of economic 
entities which are financed mainly by loans, then the drop in production and 
a reduction in inflationary pressures [Loyo 1999: 1–20]. In the case of 
expansionary policy of the central bank, interest rates are reduced, which means 
cheaper access to the central bank sources and the increase in liquidity 
of commercial banks and decrease in  interbank market interest rates. The result 
of this is to increase the supply of credit to businesses and households, lower 
their interest rates and then, increase investment, production, employment and 
inflationary pressures [Christiano et al. 1994: 1–53].  
                                       
1
 http://www.nbp.pl/home.aspx?f=/polityka_pieniezna/polityka_pieniezna.html,  
access on 10.08.2014. 
2
 www.nbp.pl, access on 23.07.2014. 
3
 http://www.nbp.pl/home.aspx?f=/polityka_pieniezna/polityka_pieniezna.html, 
access on 10.08.2014. 
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The aim of neutral monetary policy is adjustment or maintenance of the rate 
of growth of the money supply to economic growth in the long term. 
In conclusion, as E. W. Nier wrote, the main objective of the monetary policy is 
to control the interest and inflation rates. Monetary policy is focused on money 
supply and inflation rates. It is essential to monetary authorities to lead correct 
policy [Nier 2009: 6–10]. 
2. FISCAL POLICY AND ITS GOALS 
Fiscal policy is managed by the government and as the part of economic 
policy uses public revenues (for example taxes) and public expenditures. When 
the fiscal policy is inappropriately guided, this can contribute to a higher budget 
deficit and higher public debt. According to Maastricht Treaty the ratio of gross 
government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal 
year. The similar criterion is connected with the ratio of the annual government 
deficit to gross domestic product (GDP), which must not exceed 3% at the end 
of the preceding fiscal year [The Treaty on European Union, 1992]. 
The main objective of fiscal policy is to increase the aggregate output of the 
economy. Fiscal policy is focused on the stability of economy in order to 
provide stable economic growth, allocation of funds, development and 
distribution of funds (how much it will be set aside and for what purpose, and 
how those funds will be distributed throughout each segment of the economy) 
[Leeper 1991: 129–147]. There are two main government tools to do it: spending 
and taxes. Unemployment rate is also important for fiscal policy. When we have 
high unemployment rate fewer people are paying taxes and fewer people can 
afford to spend their money on goods and services. That is why it is very 
important to use taxes properly. High taxes mean lower disposable income – this 
leads to less consumption [Działo 2012: 27–31]. 
The fiscal policy is tight when the government cuts its spending or increases 
the rate of taxation. The government can reduce inflationary pressure and 
improve government finances. The government uses the restrictive fiscal policy 
when the budget of state is unbalanced and there is a threat that budget deficit 
will be too high [Kopits and Symansky 1998: 1–5]. Loose (or expansionary) 
fiscal policy is when the authority cuts down the tax rates and the government’s 
spending is higher (for example on consumption and investment). This can lead 
to a situation when the spending is financed by budget deficit (expenditures 
exceed revenues) or budget debt. This kind of fiscal policy is focused on 
encouraging aggregated demand and economic activity. That leads to higher 
national income (production and employment rates are increased) [Działo 2012: 
27–31]. To sum up, appropriately led fiscal policy by government is very 
important, because it involves primarily national income, employment, taxes and 
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3. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY 
The concept of policy mix means the combination of the monetary policy 
and the fiscal policy of a country. It can be said that there are two keystones 
of macroeconomic policy. Policy mix is a result of the decision of fiscal and 
monetary authorities, which are autonomic [Owsiak 2012: 48]. Coordination 
of the two aforementioned policies is very important. Thanks to it, it is possible 
that the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy is higher [Marszałek 2006: 57              
–58]. Policy mix has a particular sense in the extraordinary conditions such as 
the financial crisis. Fiscal and monetary policies have influence on 
macroeconomic stability. The lack of appropriate policy mix was one of the 
reasons of the recent financial crisis and lead to many adverse effects on the 
economy. These both policies are used by economic authorities in order to 
achieve its macroeconomic objectives. That is why this issue is so essential and 
should not be marginalized by authorities. 
Monetary policy and fiscal policy play an important role in the economy. 
They have an enormous impact on a number of economic variables and 
influence each other as well. In the face of the recent financial crisis, which 
turned into a debt crisis, it was observed that fiscal and monetary authorities 
have been working together to revive economic activity [Stawska 2012: 228]. 
It should be stressed that there are differences between them: fiscal policy is 
responsible for economic growth and monetary policy must be concerned about 
interest rates and inflation target. Targets and preferences of both: fiscal and 
monetary authorities reflect their aspirations. Reconciliation of actions is the 
right choice for both authorities. There are a lot of mutual interactions between 
them. Fiscal policy influences conditions, where the monetary policy operates, 
and conversely, monetary policy initiates conditions, in which fiscal policy 
operates. When we have a conflict between fiscal and monetary policy, this can 
lead to an increase in the interest rates and the budget deficit, what it is not 
a desirable situation for a state [Kuttner 2002: 3]. 
Kuttner emphasizes the significant issue concerning the importance of fiscal 
policy as a tool of stabilization in the economy. Thus, he cites the traditional 
view in the United States that the fiscal policy is not flexible enough to be an 
effective tool for stabilization, which supports the opinions of Dornbusch and 
Fischer [Dornbusch and Fischer  1990: 462]. In addition, Kuttner argues his view 
that fiscal policy is influenced by political and military factors. Therefore, 
macroeconomic stabilization is due in large part to the monetary authorities. 
In contrast, fiscal policy is to some extent a demand shock that monetary 
authorities must take into account [Kuttner 2002: 3]. P. Claeys indicates that the 
issue of sustainability of public finances has repeatedly led economic 
government programs in the U. S., Japan and the European Union. EU countries 
have even inscribed targets for public debt and budget deficit in the Maastricht 
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Treaty and then strengthened these provisions in the Stability and Growth Pact. 
In fact, it is some kind of political game where the monetary and fiscal 
authorities are trying to determine the rules of its benefits. However, the 
monetary authorities take this issue into account, that the instability of public 
finance requires some limitations of monetary policy in the longer term [Claeys 
2006: 89–90]. J. B. Taylor gives the results of research, which shows that the 
monetary policy rules use the instrument of interest rates for adjusting the 
inflation, and the production operates much better than the rule, in which there is 
no instrument to react to real GDP. He also stresses that it is possible to create 
a rule of policy mix in which monetary policy would react only on the level 
of inflation and fiscal policy only on the level of GDP. In other words, fiscal 
policy could adjust to compensate for the limitations of monetary policy, 
however, the adjustment of fiscal policy would probably be very difficult to 
apply in practice because of the size and scale of these adjustments. Hence, 
J. B. Taylor concludes that the monetary policy rule that responds not only to 
inflation, but also on the real level of production has a more practical use [Taylor 
1997: 21–22]. The literature describes a special case of mismatch between the 
central bank policy and government policy occurring at the time of fiscal 
dominance, when the monetary authorities are no longer able to keep inflation 
under control regardless of the choice of its strategy. This theory was formulated 
by T. J. Sargent and N. Wallace as a „theory of unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic”. T. Sargent and N. Wallace pointed out that fiscal indiscipline often 
causes tightening of monetary policy, which could worsen the situation in 
the market. In turn too restrictive monetary policy of the central bank can cause 
higher cost of disinflation and increase the burden on the conduct of fiscal policy 
[Sargent and Wallace 1981: 1–7]. 
H. Bennett and N. Loayza emphasize that coordination or lack of it is 
an important issue for the whole economy. In addition, it should be mentioned 
that the monetary and fiscal authorities have other instruments of impact on 
the economy, other objectives, preferences, and sometimes even other 
perceptions about the functioning of the economy. Therefore, they analyze the 
impact of the lack of coordination of policy mix on the level of the budget deficit 
and real interest rates using the game theory [Bennett and Loayza 2001: 300–301]. 
4. POLICY MIX DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Globalization has caused the wide openness of most countries. Global 
economy is characterized by strict system of linkages between countries. 
Therefore the positive and negative economic changes move fast and are more 
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The crisis in global financial markets was visible as early as in 2007, and 
then deepened in 2008. As a result of the credit crunch and liquidity crisis in 
the major financial markets of the world in 2008, the liquidity situation in the 
interbank market has been destabilized. In Poland, the first signs of the crisis 
appeared in the second half of 2008. After the announcement of on 
15 September 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and gradually disclosed the 
liquidity problems of other entities operating in the international financial 
markets. Situation on financial markets deteriorated significantly. This had 
an indirect impact on the functioning of the domestic interbank market. 
As a result of the disruption in the financial markets in August, the inclination 
of banks to provide unsecured loans was decreased and credit limits established 
for bank customers were reduced. At the same time banks limited their 
participation in the 7-day open market operations conducted by the NBP 
preferring to keeping spare cash in current accounts at the central bank or 
a deposit at the end of the day. In response to this situation NBP decided to 
introduce in October 2008 the so called „Confidence Package” whereby the 
central bank started its repo operations, which supplied to the banking sector 
liquidity and allowed banks to raise currency funds through foreign currency 
swaps. In 2008 the NBP undertook numerous anti-crisis activities which made 
medium-term financing for banks possible [Raport roczny 2008, 2009: 5–10]: 
 launched operations providing the banking sector with longer-term 
liquidity – up to 6 months, 
 expanded the list of eligible repo operation collaterals, 
 reduced the rate of required minimum reserves,  
 redeemed the NBP bonds before maturity. 
It should be stressed that in 2008 short-term liquidity of the banking sector 
amounted to 10 964 million PLN compared to 19 814 million PLN in 2007 
(annualized decline of 8 850 million PLN). In turn, the value of operations repo 
supplying the banking market in the liquidity amounted to 34 329.2 million PLN 
in 2008 [Raport roczny 2008, 2009: 6]. The main factor that contributed to the 
reduction of liquidity in the banking sector during this period was the increase 
in currency in circulation. In October 2008, in the reserve maintenance period 
the value of the amount of money significantly increased (an average of 5 935 
million PLN, compared to the same period of the previous year increased by 
151 million PLN, which is the highest increase in this category for several 
years). This was the result of concerns about the stability of the financial system 
in Poland in the event of a deepening crisis in international financial markets. 
The uncertainty in the markets meant that some customers of financial 
institutions decided to withdraw previously invested cash and store it. In turn, 
banks in response to the substantial withdrawal of deposited funds decided to 
enlarge their funds in cash as collateral [Raport roczny 2008, 2009: 12]. 
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In Poland, the NBP uses the open market operations and minimum requirement 
reserve to manage the level of liquidity of the banking sector [Cendal 2006: 269]. 
The chart 1 shows the level of the balance of short-term liquidity of the 
banking sector in the years 2007–2013. 
 
 
Chart 1. The short-term liquidity of the banking sector in average annual terms                                      
in the period 2007–2013 
Source: own elaboration based on statistical data from NBP for years 2007–2013. 
 
The above chart shows that the lowest level of the short-term liquidity of the 
banking sector was in 2008 – when the financial crisis started. This was caused 
by the increasing distrust in the interbank market. The detailed analysis of this 
data can indicate that the NBP provided the liquidity for the market during the 
financial crisis. The repo operations were applied in the intervening years. 
In 2008 NBP basic interest rate was changed six times. In the first half 
of the year due to an increase in the level of inflation determined by changes 
in food prices, energy prices and administered prices (average annual inflation 
measured by the CPI was 4.2% compared to 2,5% in 2007, graph 1), the 
reference rate was four times increased by a total of 1 percent point, but in the 
second half of the year due to the start of the financial crisis and the fall 
in inflation Monetary Policy Council (MPC) cut interest rates twice by a total 
of 1 percentage point. At the end of 2008 NBP reference rate was 5% (for which 
changed the interbank market rate WIBOR 3M being the basis housing loans or 
investment, graph 2). It is worth noting that the Polish economy in the first half 
of 2008 was in a period of significant economic growth (annual GDP growth in 
2008 amounted to 5% compared to 6,6% in 2007, graph 1), where the dominant 
role was played by the dynamic growth of consumption and investment. This 
situation began to change as early as the second half of 2008, because 
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This translated into a decline in exports and industrial production, and thus GDP 
[Raport roczny 2008, 2009: 10–31]. Since 2008 was also changing the situation 
in public finance because the budget deficit rose from 1,9% in 2007 to 3,7% 
in 2008 and public debt increased from 45% in 2007 to 47% GDP in 2008 
(tab. 1 and 2).  
 
Table 1. The budget deficit in Poland and EU in the years 2007–2013 
Public balance (budget deficit) (% GDP) 
Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Poland –1,9 –3,7 –7,5 –7,9 –5,0 –3,9 –4,3 
EU–27 –0,9 –2,4 –6,9 –6,5 –4,5   
EU–28      –3,9 –3,3 
Source: own elaboration based on statistical data from GUS for years 2007–2013. 
 
During the financial crisis, a number of anti-crisis measures taken in the 
area of monetary policy and fiscal policy was significant. In November 2008, 
adopted „Stability and Development Plan” contains instruments that were 
designed to improve confidence in the interbank market and halt the decline 
in lending. 
 
Table 2. The public debt in Poland and EU in the years 2007–2013 
General government debt (% GDP) 
Years 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Poland 45,0 47,1 50,9 54,9 56,2 55,6 57,1 
EU–27 59,0 62,5 74,8 80,0 82,5   
EU–28      85,2 87,2 
Source: own elaboration based on statistical data from GUS for years 2007–2013. 
 
In 2009 to mitigate the impact of the global crisis on the Polish economy, 
the activities of the NBP focused on continuing monetary easing and on the 
supplying of banks with liquidity. As a result, the NBP interest rates have been 
reduced by a total of 150 base points (graph 2), while the NBP reference rate has 
been significantly reduced and amounted to 3.5 percentage points under 
conditions of inflation at 3.5% and economic growth at 1.7% (graph 1). Strong 
economic slowdown resulted in deterioration of public finances (in 2009 deficit 
in relation to GDP was 7.1% and public debt was 50,9%, tab. 1 and 2). This 
resulted mainly from the operation of the so-called automatic stabilizers and 
an increase in the structural deficit in the public finances, which was one of the 
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factors mitigating the impact of the crisis on the Polish economy. The 
government in 2009 decided on a significant increase in the level of expenditure 
of the state budget, which amounted to 749.9 billion PLN, compared to 668.4 
billion PLN in 2008 with the simultaneous increase in gross investment 
expenditures of the public sector, which accounted for respectively 5.2% of GDP 
in 2009, and 4.6% of GDP in 2008 [Raport roczny 2009, 2010: 3–34]. 
Within the framework of anti-crisis measures, fiscal authorities have sought 
to stimulate investment demand and consumption by limiting: the tax burden and 
social security contributions, as well as administrative barriers and providing 
facilitation in obtaining EU funds or facilitate within the public-private 
partnership. In August 2009 also the Act was introduced by which the fiscal 
authorities sought to keep jobs in enterprises by introducing more flexible 
solutions in terms of working time accounts and additional benefits 
[Koniunktura gospodarcza w wybranych krajach…, 2011: 42]. 
 
 
Graph 1. Inflation CPI (%) and GDP (%) in Poland in years 2007–2013 
Source: own elaboration based on statistical data from GUS for years 2007–2013. 
 
In 2010 inflation measured by the CPI was 2.6%, hence, the Monetary 
Policy Council kept the key interest rates unchanged and historically low levels 
(graph 1 and graph 2). Due to the improvement in the financial markets and 
increase in liquidity in the interbank market NBP decided to gradually limit the 
instruments of extraordinary liquidity support of banks, which launched in 2008 
(Confidence Package). However, despite the improvement in the financial 
market (GDP growth of 3.8%, graph 1), public finance deficit rose to 7.9% 
(public debt rose to 54,9%, tab. 1 and 2), to which contributed an increase 
in public expenditure in relation to GDP. It is worth noting that as a result of the 
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created for Systemic Risk Board, whose goal is to counteract the build-up 
of systemic risk and ensuring the safety of the financial system [Raport roczny 
2010, 2011: 3–32]. 
 
 
Graph 2. NBP reference rate (%) and interbank market rate WIBOR 3M (%)                                          
in Poland in years 2007–2013 
Source: own elaboration based on data from „Raport roczny NBP” for years 2007–2013. 
 
In the next 2011 economic growth of the Polish economy was 4.3% with 
CPI at 4.3% (graph 1), resulting in the decision of MPC to raise interest rates 
four times by 100 basis points, resulting in the reference rate on the level 
of 4.5% in 2011 (graph 2). The decline in the budget deficit to 5.0% of GDP was 
noticeable (with public debt at the level of 56,2% of GDP, tab. 1 and 2). On this 
decline influenced several factors, primarily the reduction of the contribution 
made to open pension funds (OFE), lower growth in public spending, especially 
in local government units and the Labour Fund and the relatively higher 
economic growth [Raport roczny 2011, 2012: 3–35]. In 2012 was recorded 
decline in GDP (1.9%), which with the inflation rate of 3,7% (graph 1) allowed 
MPC on easing of monetary policy and the gradual reduction of the reference 
rate to 2.5% in July 2013 (graph 2). Moreover, in 2012 continued the process 
of reducing the public sector deficit, which amounted to 3.9% (in 2012 public 
debt was 55,6%, tab. 1 and 2) [Raport roczny 2011, 2012: 15]. In 2013 the 
inflation rate amounted to 0,9% and it was on the low level as well as the 
economic growth which amounted to 1,6% [Informacja o sytuacji społeczno-
-gospodarczej kraju w 2013 r., 2014: 3–4]. Despite the restrictive fiscal policy 
in 2013 increased the budget deficit and public debt, respectively 4.3% and 
57.1%. It should be emphasized that the pro-cyclical fiscal policy affects the 
decisions taken by the monetary authorities, which often is not conducive to the 
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emerged a unique situation even justifying the expansive fiscal policy 
of countercyclical action in order to reduce wave of bankruptcies of enterprises, 
a strong rise in unemployment, even at the cost of increasing the deficit and 
public debt. 
CONCLUSION 
The harmonization and appropriate coordination of monetary and fiscal 
policy is important because: this can eliminate both sources of conflict, this can 
lead to minimize maintenance costs and price stability and it has a positive 
impact on many economic variables.  
It is enormously difficult to choose the most correct combination between 
fiscal and monetary policy, because of having dissimilar direct goals of the both 
policies [Wernik 2002: 1]. The right policy mix is supposed to achieve desirable 
macroeconomic outcomes, such as price stability, credit availability, economic 
growth or financial stability [Ciak 2002]. To sum up, in order to achieve 
a growth of investments and economic activity, the interactions between the 
monetary and fiscal policies are of extreme importance. 
One of the greatest financial crisis in recent years, which started 
in the United States had a significant impact on the contemporary economy 
in the world, mainly in the form of a drop in demand and turmoil in the financial 
markets. At the same time it has brought new challenges: mainly in the area 
of liquidity in the interbank market or the use of fiscal incentives inter alia 
connected with: the increasing of budgetary expenditure or reduce the tax 
burden. Finally, the policy mix did not remain passive in the face of the collapse 
of 2007, however, the appropriate reconciliation of the monetary and fiscal 
interests has been difficult to achieve. 
Analysis of statistical data made it possible to achieve the purpose of the 
article and positive verification of the hypothesis. In the face of the challenges 
that have emerged in connection with the financial crisis, both the monetary and 
fiscal authorities taken coordinated, extraordinary measures to stimulate 
economic growth. The central bank introduced additional operations to support 
liquidity in the interbank market and lowered interest rates to stimulate 
economic activity. In turn, the government in the initial phase of the crisis 
increased budget spending, particularly spending on investments and introduced 
legislative changes in order to stop unemployment and stimulate economic 
growth. It is worth mentioning at this point that Poland was the only EU country 
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